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Abstract: The subject of this paper is Rudolf Hermann 
Lotze’s concept of Geltung as him outlines it in the sec-
ond Logik (1874). This paper, through the notions of 
gnoseological immanentism and anti-psychologism, aims 
to shed light on the notion of validity (Geltung). The Gel-
tung’s concept is very interesting not only for the role that 
it plays in Lotze’s philosophy, but also for the importance 
that Lotze’s validity has in the philosophical debate until 
the 1930s.  
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A brief introduction to the theme of «validity» in 
Lotze’s Logik 
 
This contribution aims to shed light on the concept of va-
lidity that Rudolf Hermann Lotze outlines in the second 
edition of his Logik. Lotze’s concept of validity is very 
important for the Neo-Kantian Baden School, as well as 
for Frege, Husserl and the young Heidegger. After pre-
senting the main coordinates of this general diffusion of 
Lotze’s philosophy, we will focus on the concept of va-
lidity in itself. The introduction of this concept to phi-
losophy was a response, according to Lotze, to a set of 
theoretical exigencies. Once the correspondence theory of 
truth had been rejected, the objectivity of knowledge no 
longer resided in the recreation of a world irremediably 
external to man; this objectivity became instead immanent 
in our inner world of representations. This inner world 
should not be understood  as subject to the changeability 
of the psychological processes; rather it guarantees fixity 
and stability to the very structure of knowledge. As an 
anti-psychologist, Lotze had both to guarantee the inter-
subjectivity of our thought’s contents, and at the same 
time defend the complete objectivity of cognition. The 
answer to these questions is, for Lotze, supplied by va-
lidity. Validity is the reality itself of our thought’s con-
tents, the famous ‘third realm’, a third path that positions 
itself between transcendent reality and the subjectivism of 
the psychological process which creates representations. 
John Passmore describes Lotze as the most «pillaged» 
philosopher of the nineteenth century.1 The widespread 
influence of his thought is the result of the second edition 
of his Logik,2 published in Lipsia in 1874. The original 
version, first printed in Berlin in 1843, merges completely 
into the first book of the 1874 edition and is entitled Vom 
Denken. The subject of this first part of Lotze’s Logik is 
not new, dealing as it does with formal logic and the theo-
ries of concept, judgment and syllogism. However, the 
second (Vom Untersuchen) and the third (Vom Erkennen) 
books go on to discuss applied logic (Angewandte Logik) 
and the theory of knowledge. It was precisely this ex-
panded version of Logik, the first part of a System der 
Philosophie, which Lotze never completed, that aroused 
such interest in so many academic philosophers. 
The concept of validity (Geltung) is central to the en-
tire 1874 work and it must therefore be analysed carefully 
so as to understand both its origin and its significance for 
academic philosophy. Importantly, Lotze argues that the 
concept of logical validity must be distinguished from the 
subjective psychological process. Though this idea is not 
entirely new in philosophy – earlier traces can be found in 
the works of Kant, Leibniz and Herbart – it was Lotze 
who gathered and synthesised earlier teachings into this 
succinct distinction and introduced the term Geltung to 
philosophy.  
In Logik, Lotze argues against tendencies that reduce 
thought to a mere representative process, giving thinkers 
such as Frege, Windelband and Husserl strong arguments 
against Psychologism. Lotze’s anti-psychologism does 
not exclude the role of psychology outright, it simply 
points out that there is a categorical difference between 
psychology and logic. 
The concept of validity had a central role in logic and 
epistemology until the 1930s. If we turn our attention to 
the philosophical debate of the German philosophers, we 
see that the arguments of both the Neo-Kantians and the 
Phenomenologists were deeply rooted in Lotze’s Logik. 
The Neo-Kantian Baden school – of which the prominent 
exponents were Windelband, Liebmann, Rickert, Bauch, 
and Lask – was clearly and explicitly influenced by 
Lotze. Franz Brentano as well was in regular contact with 
Lotze and Brentano’s disciples Stumpf (Husserl’s Dok-
torvater) and Marty often attended Lotze’s lectures. 
The work of Lotze that established his centrality and 
relevance within the philosophical context of his time 
was, as has been said, his second Logik and, in particular, 
its third book, which must be read with great attention. It 
MICHELE VAGNETTI 
 130 
is here that Lotze introduces the concept of validity. In its 
second chapter, «The World of Ideas», Lotze reinterprets 
Plato’s thought in light of the Gelten problem. Here Lotze 
affirms Plato’s recognition that ideas have validity of their 
own which has nothing to do with the existence of things. 
Plato locates ideas in the Hyperuranion, a world of pure 
validity, in order to clarify, according to Lotze, that ideas 
do not belong to the real world. This interpretation allows 
Lotze to reconcile arguments in defence of Platonic 
thought with those of Kantian philosophy, arguing that 
the logical content of thought, according to Platonic doc-
trine, is independent from the subjectivity of the individ-
ual thinker, while at the same time reevaluating in a Kant-
ian sense the role of the transcendental because the logical 
content’s independence from the real world is not onto-
logical but rather logical. This is more concerned not with 
existence, but with validity. 
The categories by which logic proceeds are those 
based on the «distinction of value as that between truth 
and untruth»3. True and False cannot belong to simple 
subjective psychological processes but must instead refer 
to contents, which are always identical, of the thought it-
self. The condition of possibility by which a logical con-
tent can be recognised as true or false is one in which the 
mind can capture the same knowledge, regardless of any 
particular subjective psychological process, and thus dis-
cuss its same logical content. Thought, therefore, cannot 
be conceived as a simple subjective psychic process be-
cause, if that were the case, one could not grasp the same 
thought and the same content. Thought, therefore, has its 
intersubjective merit; it bears the truth value, and in this 
sense must be said to have no individual, psychological 
existence. Thought and its logical content do not exist in 
strict sense, but they do have validity ; validity does not 
imply existence. The logical content of thought, as the 
bearer of truth value and that transcendental condition 
which allows one to speak about true and false in logic, is 
not however an ontological entity. To make this step in 
the argument clear, we must consider Lotze’s conception 
of validity as a «form of Reality (Wirklichkeit)», in his 
own words: 
 
We call a thing Real (wirklich) which is (ist), in contradistinc-
tion to another which is not (nicht ist); an event Real which oc-
curs or has occurred, in contradistinction to that which does not 
occur; a relation Real which obtains (besteht), as opposed to one 
which does not obtain; lastly we call a proposition Really true 
(wirklich wahr) which holds or is valid (gilt) as opposed to one 
of which the validity is still doubtful. This use of language is 
intelligible; it shows than when we call anything Real (Wirk-
lichkeit), we mean always to affirm it, though in different senses 
according to the different forms which it assumes, but one or 
other of which it must necessarily assume, and of which no one 
is reducible to or contained in the other. […] The reality of a 
proposition means that it holds or is valid (gilt) and that its op-
posite does not hold.4  
 
In this way Lotze lays the foundation for the distinction 
between logical and psychological inquiry. He attributes 
to thoughts, understood as the meanings of propositions 
(Sätze), the statute of objectivity5: that is, the independ-
ence of logical content from the individual subject who 
thinks them. Logical content is objective, but not real; it 
can acquire reality only through a psychological realiza-
tion, either as events or as the Really true, that is valid, as 
explained in the quotation above. The self-identity con-
tent of the proposition returns as Gedanke in Frege, Sin-
ngebilde in Rickert, Objectiv in Meinong, ideal iden-
tischer Inhalt in Husserl6 and logischer Inhalt in Heideg-
ger7. 
The logical theory of validity was further developed 
by two alternative schools of thought: the Neo-Kantian 
Baden school and Phenomenology. The Baden school ex-
panded Lotze’s theory of validity (Geltung) beyond logic, 
constructnig a theory which also includes ethics and aes-
thetics, with corresponding distinctions in the sphere of 
value. The phenomenological tradition, at least in the be-
ginning was particularly attentive to logical-ontological 
problems. Husserl, on the basis of Frege’s intuitions8, 
took Lotze’s distinction between the objective contents of 
thought (unreal) and real thought events as the point of 
departure for his research in logic. Noteworthy, too, is the 
fact that in the same year that Ideen I was published, 
Husserl decided to add to a reprint of Logische Unter-
suchungen a long introduction about the problem of 
realizing logical ideality in the concreteness of Erlebnis9. 
Lotze’s anti-psychologism was also fundamental import-
ance for Heidegger – as a student both of Husserl and the 
neo-kantian Rickert – as can be seen clearly in Neuere 
Forschungen über Logik10, in which Heidegger defines 
Lotze’s Logik as the «fundamental book (Grundbuch)»11 
of modern logic. It is also important to remember that 
Heidegger recommended that his student Picht read 
Lotze’s Logik as an introduction to philosophy12. In Sein 
und Zeit, Heidegger argues against the contemporary 
theory of validity, defining validity as a «verbal idol 
(Wortgötze)»13. 
By the term “logic,” Lotze intended not just logic in 
the strict sense of the word, but also the theory of know-
ledge itself. It is not simply incidental that Lotze’s theory 
of validity influenced the various theories of knowledge 
of his time. A useful example of this influence is the 
problem of a priori, discussed in the third chapter of 
Logik’s third book. Lotze says: 
 
It is clear therefore that the attempt to derive the entire body of 
general knowledge from experience, that is to say from a mere 
summing up of particular perceptions, breaks down. We have 
invariably to help ourselves out by assuming at one point or an-
other some one of those self-evident principles, some principle 
to which when once its content has been thought we at once 
concede with intuitive confidence that universal validity to 
which it makes claim.14 
 
This conception so lucidly expressed by Lotze had, for 
example, direct influence on the concept of induction 
proposed by Liebmann and Frege. Arguing against em-
piricism, Otto Liebmann states that induction is impos-
sible without «fundamental universally valid truths (all-
gemeingültige Fundamentalwahrheiten)»15. Frege, mean-
while, in acomplete agreement with Liebmann and Lotze, 
reaffirms Lotze’s distinction between genetic-psycho-
logical issues and validity issues (Genese und Geltung). 
Logic, like epistemology, does not deal with the psychic 
process, but with the validity of propositions. 
This example of induction demonstrates the import-
ance of Lotze’s thought for the philosophical debate of 
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the time. Logik is the «fundamental book», not only for 
logic, but also for the modern theory of knowledge. This, 
too is a confirmation of the importance of Lotze’s 
thought, in which logical investigation must not be di-
vided from the theory of knowledge. In addition, the im-
port of this philosopher in the field of psychology must 
not be forgotten. As both medical doctor and philosopher, 
Lotze made a decisive contribution to both fields in the 
first half of the nineteenth century; by applying the scien-
tific method to psychological analysis, he therefore in-
creased psychophysiological analysis. This aspect of 
Lotze’s thought had a fundamental role in the develop-
ment of other great thinkers, in particular Charles Sanders 
Peirce and William James. In conclusion, it is not difficult 
to agree with Passmore when he describes Lotze as the 
most «pillaged» philosopher of the nineteenth century. 
 
 
Gnoseological immanentism and the rejection of the 
correspondence theory of truth: the question of skep-
ticism: an analysis 
 
The third book of the second Logik, Lotze’s most influen-
tial work in the development of the nineteenth and twenti-
eth century philosophical debate, deals with logical-
epistemological issues. This book is dedicated, as Lotze 
affirms in Einleitung, to «the general question of the logi-
cal methods with which a theory of the nature of thought 
(die Lehre vom Denken) ordinarily concludes»16. The real 
object of research (Gegenstand der Untersuchung) «is not 
to enquire into the content of the principles in question, 
but into the grounds upon which, in a subjective sense, 
their certainty rests; to ask not what is the truth, but what 
are the marks by which we recognise it and distinguish it 
from error»17 . At the root of skepticism is the alleged im-
possibility of distinguishing truth from error. The human 
mind attempts a reflection upon the peculiar laws of its 
own activity and wonders why these laws bring with them 
a promise of true knowledge and, in spite of this, we are 
often attracted, seemingly inevitably, to error. If this ap-
parent contradiction is not fully investigated, the conclu-
sion to which it leads is skepticism. 
The skeptic, professing the impossibility of certain 
knowledge on the one hand, cannot on the other hand 
deny every truth, inasmuch as that doubt is made possible 
only by the recognition of some form of truth. For Lotze, 
this truth, that skepticism cannot deny, consists in the fact 
that human thought has certain fundamental laws that af-
firm, for all events the impossibility of agreement be-
tween representation and truth18 . The skeptic must admit 
the presence of truth because it is precisely through these 
laws of thought that doubt is produced and extended to all 
our investigations of knowledge. The fundamental ques-
tion is whether or not it is precisely these laws of thought 
which are in error and which present each thing to us en-
tirely differently from the way it is in reality. To the mere 
possibility of renewing doubt without any positive foun-
dation, Lotze opposes the principle of Selbstvertrauen der 
Vernunft19 . The principle of faith in reason in itself repre-
sents the premise of every knowledge inquiry. It affirms 
that reality and thought are in agreement with one another 
and that thought has limited access to reality, but that this 
does not render it misleading. This principle allows us to 
discover that which necessarily appears through the ne-
cessary laws of thought, the truth. This achievement oc-
curs through the continual verification of the results ob-
tained, and has as its sole criterion the laws of logical-
conceptual activity20 . For Lotze, the question of skepti-
cism – which asks if things are in realty different from 
how they necessarily appear in our representations – is 
based on a profound prejudice which opposes being-in-
itself (Ansichsein) with the way in which it is represented 
by the necessary laws of thought. Lotze clearly argues 
against the correspondence theory of truth: knowledge is 
not a «copy of a world of things (Abbilden einer Sachen-
welt)»21 nor an agreement of our ideas with the real condi-
tion of the things our ideas claim to reproduce22 . 
The task Lotze sets himself is not to demonstrate the 
reality of the world of things in itself – the systems of 
idealism and realism had already tackled this, coming to 
radically distinct conclusions – but rather «the recognition 
of the competence of thought». «Secondly», Lotze con-
tinues, «we have to show that nothing else, but the con-
nection of our representations with each other can ever be 
made the object of our investigations»23 . One point must 
be clarified here: for Lotze, the subjective origin of our 
knowledge does not invalidate the results of knowing. 
Regarding the problem of the competence of thought, 
Lotze explicitly argues that it is the only door with access 
to the truth: «whatever is the truth can be discovered only 
by the reflective operation of thought (Selbstbesinnung 
des Denkens), continually trying and testing its single re-
sults by the standard of the universal laws of its activity»24 
. In relation to the question regarding our representation 
as the sole object of inquiry, Lotze states that our repre-
sentations of the external world are nothing more than 
simple subjective representations indifferent to the prob-
lem of the existence or non-existence of a world of things 
that goes beyond our consciousness. All our knowledge is 
subjective in nature and so cannot take a position on the 
existence of its object nor on the exactness of the repre-
sentation by which we present it25 . Lotze’s epistemology 
combines gnoseological immanentism with the irrefutable 
reality of the external world. By means of this combina-
tion, Lotze succeeds in setting aside both the supposed 
identity of Gelten and Sein of idealistic memory, as well 
as that unbridgeable hiatus which skepticism interposes 
between phenomena and the reality they depict. 
Lotze credits the Gedankenwelt as the sole object of 
our knowledge. He does not ignore the value of the trans-
cendent object, but excludes the metaphysical reality from 
the knowledge process. As he in fact points out, «this as-
sumed external world of the Real does not come in here 
between our representations as the standard by which 
their truth is to be measured; the standard is always the 
representation of which we cannot get rid, of what such a 
world must be if it does exist, the representation that is to 
say of thought (Gedanken) in our own minds; this it is by 
which we measure the truth of other thoughts, whether 
they contain the evidence in themselves or require eluci-
dation from without»26. As we can clearly see, Lotze 
makes a distinction between the representational activity 
and its objective correlative, within the field of con-
sciousness content. Starting with the recognition of the 
purely subjective nature of the mind, we are led to affirm 
that nothing can be said about the truth of the representa-
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tions that come from it, but for Lotze this is not a proof of 
the non-validity does not prove the invalidity of the ac-
tivity of thought. We cannot transcend, according to 
Lotze, the sphere of what is, for us, denknotwendig and, 
as a result, the search for truth is an investigation which 
takes places entirely within the sphere of our representa-
tions. Our knowledge originates from the representations 
within us and must search, within this current27 of repre-
sentations (Vorstellungsverlauf), for the legality and order 
that are revealed clearly through the general principles of 
thought. This is the process through which the truth is 
sought. Knowledge will never be a thing in itself but a 
cognitio circa rem, a complex of representations about the 
thing. Our mind is able to know things as they appear at 
the moment in which we perceive them and not as they 
are in themselves, independently of this perceptual rela-
tion. The skeptic, through the continuous reintroduction 
of doubt, seeks «knowledge which should be more than a 
perfectly connected and consistent system of representa-
tions about the thing, a knowledge which should actually 
exhaust of thing itself»28 ; such a knowledge is, without a 
doubt, entirely unintelligible. The skeptic, formulating 
this type of request, which knowledge will never satisfy, 
does not want true knowledge about the thing (die Erk-
enntnis der Sache) but wants to be the thing itself. In the 
final analysis, skepticism, thinking that everything can be 
different from what it necessarily appears, is self-
contradictory because it thinks about the possibility of the 
existence of a kind of knowledge that does not apprehend 
things, but which is itself a thing and on the basis of this 
prejudice, doubts that such impossible perfection is within 
the reach of our intellect. 
For Lotze, having set aside the cognitive relevance of 
the transcendent object, there remains another way of in-
vestigation: «the endeavour to discover within the world 
of representations itself (innerhalb der Vorstellungswelt) 
what are the fixed points, the primary certainties, starting 
from which we may be able to bring the rest of the shift-
ing multitude of its representations into something like 
orderly connection»29 . The Vorstellungswelt is the field 
«within» which we can construct our knowledge palace. 
Knowledge will consist of interrogations into the con-
gruity which exists between the relation actually existing 
in the consciousness and the general assumptions of 
thought that we have to formulate for any relation. Lotze 
does not care about the origin of our representations, but 
he does attach much importance to the task of critically 
evaluating their content, so that – as its only possible aim 
– we can make sure our reason corresponds to itself and 
to the facts to which it is applied30 . The error will there-
fore lie in the inner contradiction within our Vorstel-
lungswelt and therefore, correspondingly, the knowledge 
of truth will be the discovery of the laws which all con-
nection in the world of representations must absolutely 
observe. This procedure will be an inexhaustible task, the 
whole truth constituting a difficult and improbable goal to 
which we must nevertheless constantly aspire. Ultimately, 
declaring the world of representations the only object of 
the process of knowing means that the basic argument of 
Lotze’s theory of knowledge can be summarized as the 
idea that an apprehending intelligence can not grasp the 
truth in itself, but «can only see things as they look to it 
when it perceives them»31. True knowledge does not arise 
from the correspondence of the connections of representa-
tions to the «exact coincidence of the impressions», but to 
their arrangement in the order resulting from the «rela-
tions among the represented contents»32. The distinction 
referred to is that between represented content (vorgestell-
ten Inhalt), with its peculiar significance, and the simple 
impression (Eindruck) that derives from subjective ex-
perience. 
Using this distinction, Lotze defines the primary func-
tion of thought: the objectification of the subjective (Ob-
jectivirung des Subjectiven). Representations invariably 
impose on every mind, not according to the empirical fre-
quency with which certain relations manifest themselves, 
but based on a principle of coherence that thought identi-
fies in them. The relations among our representations, 
therefore, do not represent connections that we suppose to 
exist in external reality. They have their objective founda-
tion in the contents among which they occur. The rela-
tions do not exist in themselves: they exist as they are 
thought, they are part of our Vorstellungswelt and they, 
therefore, do not concern elements going beyond thought, 
being as they are only «representable contents»33. The va-
lidity in itself or the objectivity of such relations derives 
from the nature of the content which, as «representable 
contents», cannot be independent from thought in general. 
The validity of such content cannot therefore be separated 
from thought, only from its individual manifestations. The 
distinction between representational activity and objective 
content is also determined within the Vorstellungswelt 
and, to avoid the conclusion that the significance of logi-
cal activity is only subjective or formal, one must under-
line the relationship between the forms of thought and the 
content those forms find to be already in existence. 
This problem raises questions about the real signifi-
cance of logical acts. This significance cannot be thought 
of as immediately valid in relation to what is real, but 
proves merely that thought, through its own subjective 
and formal operations, is able to coincide (zusammen-
trifft) with the nature of the objective content (sachlicher 
Inhalt)34 . To such operation of thought (Denkhandlung) a 
merely subjective significance should be attributed; to the 
logical result (product) that it achieves, should be attrib-
uted an objective value. This value derives from the fact 
of its independence from individual thinking minds and – 
in its manifestation which is always identical – is 
counterposed to every mind that represents it. The oper-
ations of thought are not only subjectively and formally 
valid, but they also belong to the sachliches Verhalten of 
the contents. These operations of thought constitute: 
 
... one of the different ways in which the variously ramifying 
systems of the world of fact (Sachenwelt) makes it possible for 
us, by reason of its universal interconnection, to arrive by a pro-
cess of movement from point to point within that world, at a de-
terminate objective relation (sachliches Verhalten), although the 
particular movement chosen neither is nor yet copies the way in 
which this relation itself arose or now obtains (Bestehen).35  
 
For Lotze, it is impossible to extend our knowledge be-
yond the Vorstellungswelt; all of our effort of knowing 
must be concentrated upon the search for those “fixed 
points” and “first certainties” which constitute the logical 
connection of the changing set of our representations. The 
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search for truth only takes place in the world of represen-
tations connected by thought and, by eliminating every 
reference to a metaphysical reality, it takes on the physi-
ognomy of a double relationality: both with the connec-
tions among representations and with the respective ob-
jective content. The truth, so constituted, would be a pro-
cess by which the first relationality conforms to the sec-
ond. In phenomenological language, one can say that the 
search for truth consists in bringing to completion the co-
incidence between the representational connection and 
objective content36 . The elimination of the knowledge 
relevance of transcendent reality does not reduce the va-
lidity of knowledge itself; rather, in Lotze’s logical-
epistemological construct, an inversion of roles between 
knowledge and things occurs. Reality itself is no longer 
the limit to which our knowledge must adapt. The thing is 
no longer the end of knowledge but the means and the 
cause that awaken in us, «in all its details, the spectacle of 
the world of representations (das ganze Schauspiel der 
Vorstellungswelt)»37. The objective of knowledge does 
not lie, according to Lotze, in the unattainability of the 
world of things (Welt der Dinge), but in the discovery of 
the connections and laws governing our Vorstellungswelt. 
Lotze’s logical-epistemological system clearly recognizes 
that the problem of the opposition between the world of 
representations (Vorstellungswelt) and the world of things 
(Welt der Dinge) is not cognitively relevant; instead, it is 
clearly a problem for metaphysics. 
 
 
Anti-psychologism in Lotze’s thought: the role of 
thought’s contents. 
 
Before going on to consider the concept of Gelten (under-
stood as the true form of the reality of thought’s contents), 
it is appropriate to detail briefly the fundamental points of 
Lotze’s anti-psychologism. The idea at the base of 
Lotze’s anti-psychologism is that of drawing a clear dis-
tinction between the realm of logical thought and that of 
the psychological mechanism (process) of representa-
tions. From the time of his 1843 Logica minor, Lotze 
consistently maintained his conviction that it was impos-
sible to think of as united the psychological mechanism 
(process) of representations and the logical content of 
thought. In the same kleine Logik38, the intent to argue 
against Herbart and Hegel is evident. Lotze criticised 
Herbart for limiting himself to the consideration of con-
cepts and judgments as secondary aspects of psychologi-
cal processes by which the connections between represen-
tations are produced.39 Lotze disagreed with Hegel as 
well, especially criticising his affirmation of the absolute 
coincidence between Denken and Sein and that immediate 
unity between thought and being caused Hegel to assign a 
real significance to the forms of thought that thus cease to 
be only forms of thought and become as well moments of 
the essence of things40. In Lotze’s opinion, Hegel’s great-
est oversight is that metaphysical reality lies outside of 
logical-epistemological analysis. 
At the same time, it is important to remember that in 
the kleine Logik of 1843 Lotze also presented his own in-
terpretation of Kantian transcendental schematism. 
Through schematism, Kant established a nexus between 
intellect and sensibility, but according to Lotze his short-
coming lay in having related too closely the categories of 
the intellect to the knowledge of the real, the empirical 
realm41. Lotze did not believe thought to be anchored in 
the knowledge of experiential reality but rather that it is 
free from any kind of relation with metaphysical reality, 
and yet this does not mean that it is misleading or that it 
does not guarantee any kind of objectivity . Together 
these concepts constitute the premise on which Lotze’s 
anti-psychologist arguments are based. The same idea is 
emphasized by Lotze in Die Lehre vom Urtheil, contained 
in the first book of the second Logik. According to Lotze, 
even Aristotle based his logic on rigidly anti-
psychologism foundations. Aristotle never described the 
predicative connection between two terms (logical oper-
ation of katēgorein) as a simple psychological event (oc-
currence) between representations associated in our con-
sciousness. On the contrary, judgment, which consists of 
this specific logical operation, expresses an objective rela-
tion (sachliches Verhältnis) between the two contents of 
the representations. 
Lotze believed that judgment, like any other reactive 
activity of thought, is born as a result of stimuli which 
come from the world of representable contents, and there-
fore expresses a relation between contents of representa-
tions and not between the representations themselves42 . 
The «objective correctness (sachliche Richtigkeit)» of a 
judgment does not lie, according to Lotze, in the logical 
form in which it takes on a certain content, but in the rela-
tions which exist among the elements of that content. So 
that the form of judgment can give them a certain validity, 
these elements are already as the form of judgment must 
assume that they are43 . The mere psychological connec-
tion between representations is resolved only with the in-
clusion of one representation in the extension of another, 
while the logical function of judgment is to show the 
various relations that take place between the contents rep-
resented and which form the basis of the judgment 
through the meaning of the copula. The significance of 
the various forms in which a judgment can be reached lies 
in the indication of the formal conditions that provide 
apodictic validity to a certain content that already satisfies 
those conditions. Lotze writes: 
 
I have maintained the opinion throughout my work that Logic 
cannot derive any serious advantage from a discussion of the 
conditions under which thought as a psychical process 
(psychischer Vorgang) comes about. The significance (Bedeu-
tung) of logical forms is to be found in the meaning and purport 
(Sinne) of the connections into which the content (Inhalt) of our 
world of representations (Vorstellungswelt) ought to be 
brought.44  
 
While it is true that Herbart and Kant had already distin-
guished between the psychical process of concept forma-
tion (Genese) and its logical significance, it is also true 
that Lotze was the philosopher who first introduced the 
term Geltung into the philosophical vocabulary. This con-
cept attained its full philosophical significance in Lotze’s 
interpretation of Plato’s doctrine of ideas. In his interpre-
tation, validity becomes the specific form of reality that 
the contents of thought must obtain. These contents go 
beyond the mere psychical process of formation of repre-
sentation and present themselves in all their validity as 
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«objectively given (sachlich gegeben)»45 . The objectivity 
outlined by Lotze is something very different from real 
existence (wirklichen Daseins), understood both as exist-
ence-of-things and as the existence of psychical pro-
cesses. In defining the concept of Objectivität, Lotze af-
firms that it is not possible to attribute to it that «real ex-
istence (wirklichen Daseins) which would subsist even 
though nobody had thought of it»46 . Such claims were 
criticized by anti-psychologists47 because they deemed 
them to be ‘psychologistic’ motives in Lotze’s philoso-
phy. However, these criticisms were not well-founded as 
Lotze, in addition to having given the greatest importance 
to logical activities and to processes of knowing, also at-
tached great importance to the object of knowledge48 . 
Lotze attempted to justify the complementarity between 
the subjective and objective aspects of knowledge without 
using metaphysical reality as a term of comparison. We 
can affirm that Lotze’s ideas do not in fact fall into psy-
chologism in the strict sense. For Lotze neither attempts 
to identify the concept of Geltung with the purely empiri-
cal plan of the psychological formation of representation, 
nor does he espouse the excesses of subjectivism, which 
would reduce all knowledge to abstract formalism. The 
attribution of an objective validity to our representations’ 
contents does not signify the attribution of such validity to 
the psychic process that presides over the formation of the 
representation. In other words, such an attribution does 
not indicate the real mental event that takes place in time 
– for this could indeed be called true psychologism . It 
rather affirms the sense of immanence within which our 
knowledge is constituted. Lotze, entirely in keeping with 
what he had affirmed with regards to the problem of skep-
ticism, i.e. that it is necessary to neutralize any reference 
to the thing-in-itself that transcends the consciousness, 
now affirms that in the search for truth we cannot rely on 
a notion of validity which is in itself transcendent. Obvi-
ously this does not mean, however, that one must abandon 
the idea of objective knowledge. We can conclude, there-
fore, that validity is immanent in the ‘logical’ and in the 
ideality of the contents of the representations.  
 
 
The concept of Geltung  
 
Once has defined the Vorstellungswelt as the sole object 
of knowledge, Lotze must then take on the problem of 
defining its fixed points of certainty and its unique nature. 
Lotze’s response to these questions is the concept of Gel-
tung. According to Lotze, Plato’s Ideenlehre is «the first 
and most characteristic attempt to account for the truth 
which belongs to the world of our representations in itself 
(die unserer Vorstellungswelt innerhalb), without regard 
to its agreement with an assumed reality of things outside 
its borders»49 . Plato, with his «doctrine of ideas», in fact 
highlights the truth that belongs to the inner world of our 
representations. Lotze, with his interpretation of the pla-
tonic theory of ideas, wants to investigate the true «way 
of being» of such truths. Lotze chooses the term Wirk-
lichkeit to define the nature of the world of representa-
tions. For Lotze, there are four different ways in which 
the concept of Reality can be understood: the reality of a 
thing which is, the reality of an event which occurs, the 
reality of a relation which obtains and the reality of a 
proposition which holds or is valid (gilt). 
The concept of validity (Gelten) first appears in para-
graph 316 of Logik. The concept of Gelten is evidently 
more limited than the Wirklichkeit concept because the 
latter goes far beyond the domain of being. Reality, be-
sides being the domain of being and validity, also in-
cludes the event which occurs and the relation which ob-
tains. In addition, Lotze affirms that none of the forms of 
reality which he has distinguished can be derivable or 
contained by another. For example, if we can predicate a 
relational subsistence of a content of a proposition the 
unique form of reality which concerns the proposition it-
self is only that of validity. The form of reality Lotze calls 
validity has no temporal connotation. The temporal di-
mension belongs to other forms of reality, such as that of 
being and of occurring. In relation to this we can confirm 
that: 
 
the representations, in so far as they are present in our minds, 
possess reality in the sense of an Event. They occur in us, for as 
utterances of an activity of presentation they are never a Being 
at rest but a continual Becoming. On the other hand, so far as we 
regard it in abstraction from the mental activity which we direct 
to it, their content can no longer be said to occur, though neither 
again does it exist as things exist: we can only say that it pos-
sesses Validity.50  
 
Representative content remains clearly self-identical 
whether consciousness thinks about it or not. Entirely 
consistent with these arguments is Lotze’s assertion that 
the act of representation (das Vorstellen) is not coincident 
with that which it represents, nor is the idea coincident 
with what gives it meaning. This indicates that both the 
act and the content are different from the object repre-
sented and that the simpler representations do not possess 
their content in the form of a predicate; in short, the rep-
resentation of yellow is not yellow and that of the triangle 
is not triangular51 . By virtue of all that has been said, va-
lidity does not derive from a weakening of the being-of-
things nor from a structuring of the changing nature of 
our representations. Validity is a concept that denies the 
contents of thought any reality of being and affirms the 
independence of these contents from our thought. Validity 
manifests to the thinking subject in the form of what 
needs to be acknowledged and affirmed. Lotze does not 
hesitate to affirm that: 
 
as little as we can say about how it happens that anything is or 
occurs, so little can we explain how it comes about that a truth 
has Validity. The latter conception must be regarded as much as 
the former as ultimate and underivable (beruhenden Grundbe-
griff, or rather a fundamental concept that reposes on and is 
based entirely upon itself). It is a conception of which everyone 
can know the meaning, but which cannot be constructed out of 
any constituent elements which do not already contain it.52  
 
The Logik by R. H. Lotze constitutes, in the final analysis, 
an important point of reference for much of the academic 
philosophy - German and otherwise - between the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Although 
Lotze’s importance in the philosophical debate of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries is evident, his philoso-
phy was certainly not well-studied, or its study was rather 
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of ‘secondary interest’, aimed at understanding other phi-
losophers53. Recent works are reversing that trend54. 
Rudolf Hermann Lotze has returned to the center of a 
‘primary interest’, aimed at demonstrating its relevance 
and centrality in both the European and American philo-
sophical debates of the 19th and 20th centuries.  
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